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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to bring together two recent developments in the so-called “con-
tracting” approach to the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy (Persson and
Tabellini [31]; Walsh [35]; Waller [34]; Frattianni, Von Hagen and Waller [19]; Candel-
Sa´nchez and Campoy-Min˜arro[5]; Chortareas and Miller[8]). According to this principal-
agent approach, it is possible to design an optimal incentive scheme able to produce mon-
etary policy outcomes equivalent to those obtained under credible commitment. If the
central banker can be conceived as (at least in part) an egoist agent, i.e., a self-interested
utility maximizer whose decisions depend on private rewards (Chortareas and Miller [6]),
under bilateral agency (one principal and one agent) she may be taken to respond to
incentive schemes offered by her principal (society, represented by a government). The
principal can hence design a formal contract with the central banker which, from the an-
alytical viewpoint, amounts to introducing a linear incentive scheme in her loss function
that penalizes deviations of actual inflation from its target. It is well known that an op-
timal penalty rate exists that generates expectations of money growth and inflation that
are both equal to zero (Walsh [35]). This occurs because the incentive contract increases
the marginal cost for the central banker of higher money growth rates, thus counteracting
her inflationary bias.
The first development of this approach we shall build upon is represented by Chortar-
eas and Miller’s [7], hereafter CM, extension of the analysis of the linear contract to the
common agency. CM assume that the central banker can enter into a formal contract with
the government (emerging from the political process as the collective decision of society)
and into an informal contract with a private interest group reflecting a relevant disaf-
fected minority.4 CM also convincingly discuss the motivation to introduce an interest
group into the contracting approach, as this can accurately describe important features
of the actual economic environment, such as the presence of different sectors, or indus-
tries, or branches of the government having different preferences between inflation and
output. The issue seems particularly important in common currency areas (Dixit and
Jensen [15]), especially in the European context where, after the creation of the European
Central Bank, some national governments may be envisaged as interest groups lobbying,
e.g., for low interest rate, as it would occur in the case of high-debt member states, or of
countries experiencing low rates of output growth.
The interest group may have several different aims, but here we restrict our attention
to what we reckon as the most interesting case, i.e., that in which monetary policy is
delegated through inflation contracts and the second principal offers a competing output
contract (i.e., the interest group offers and incentive scheme linked to output, not to in-
flation). The main result CM achieve is that the government contract does not deliver
the commitment-equivalent results, as the output contract dominates the inflation con-
tract in affecting the central banker’s incentives: the expected money growth rate and
4As the latter contract is not likely to be explicitly announced, CM use a definition by Laffont and
Tirole [28] and label it as quasi-enforceable, meaning that the parties are taken to willingly enforce the
contract promises.
3
actual inflation which obtain when only the interest group offers an incentive scheme to
the central banker, while the government does not, are exactly the same as those that
crop up when both principals offer their contracts. Yet, output remains at the natural
level. The dominating incentive scheme provided by the interest group hence reproduces
the traditional discretionary outcome of Barro-Gordon [1] type models.
The second development of the contracting approach we shall consider is represented
by the introduction of imperfect central bank transparency into the bilateral agency model
(Muscatelli [29]; [30]; Beetsma and Jensen [2]). We rate this as a particularly relevant
issue because, in spite of a rapidly growing debate, the macroeconomic effects of trans-
parency on inflation and output (levels and variabilities), and hence on social welfare,
remain controversial at both the theoretical and the empirical levels.5 Two main types of
transparency have been envisaged in the literature. The first one is related to information
asymmetries between the central bank and the general public about the weight attached
to the arguments of the central bank’s objective function;6 this is known in the literature
as the ”contingent”, or ”political”, view of transparency. The second one refers to un-
certainty on the output target of the central bank, i.e., the so-called ”economic” view of
transparency,7 due, for example, to uncertainty about the NAIRU, or to fluctuations in
it.
When imperfect political transparency is introduced into the bilateral agency model,
the optimal solution provided by the linear contract no longer applies and a stochastic
inflation bias persists in equilibrium, reproposing the trade-off between reducing the in-
flation bias and stabilizing supply shocks (Muscatelli [29]; [30]; Beetsma and Jensen [2]).
Another important result is that under uncertainty on the central bank’s output target,
the optimal contract brings equilibrium inflation which is certainty-equivalent to that ob-
tained under full ”economic” transparency: expected inflation rates are the same, and
actual inflation depends on the value of the output target8 (Muscatelli [30], section I, case
c).
Another type of preference uncertainty, which may be labelled ”selfishness” uncer-
tainty, crops up from the assumption that the central banker’s trade-off between social
welfare and the incentive scheme is private information, i.e., that the central banker’s re-
sponsiveness to the incentive scheme is not perfectly known by all principals. Under this
assumption, and always in the case of bilateral agency, CM [6] showed that a benevolent
central banker with an inflation bias has an incentive to pretend to be selfish, and hence
to accept a contract designed for a selfish central banker, because her loss is in this case
5See, among others, Kuttner and Posen [27]; Chortareas et al. [9]; Geraats [20]; Gru¨ner [23]; Beetsma
and Jensen [3]; Posen [32]; Di Bartolomeo and Marchetti [14]; Eijffinger and Geraats [16]; Ciccarone et
al. [10]; Demertzis and Hughes- Hallett [12]; van der Cruijsen and Eijffinger [33]. See also the papers
contained in the special March 2007 issue of the European Journal of Political Economy (volume 23) on
”Central Bank Transparency and Central Bank Communication”.
6See, among others, Faust and Svensson [17] [18], Cukierman [11] and Jensen [25].
7It should be noted that there is no general agreements on these labels. For example, Geraats [20]
defines the uncertainty on target levels as imperfect political transparency.
8In this context, delegation through incentive contracts is superior to discretion only if the uncertainty
on the output target is not too large.
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lower than that she would experience if she rejected the contract and a truly selfish central
banker were appointed to conduct monetary policy. CM [6] convincingly document that
the offspring of this behavior is that positive inflation surprises occur and equilibrium
output is greater than its natural rate.
In this paper we aim to identify the changes produced by the introduction of the three
types of central bank preference uncertainty summarized above on the effects of linear
contracts in the common agency set up. To this aim, in the next section we study the
problem under the ”political” notion of transparency (uncertainty refers to the weights
attached to the ”social” objectives, i.e., output and inflation, whereas the weight attached
to the linear contract is assumed to be perfectly known by all principals). In section 2, we
instead assume that there exists uncertainty only on the central bank’s output target, so
as to study the effects produced under common agency by the consideration of imperfect
”economic” transparency. In section 3 we extend to the common agency case CM’s
[6] assumption that the central banker’s responsiveness to the incentive scheme is not
perfectly known. Section 4 concludes.
The results we obtain confirm only in part the existing findings, highlighting important
differences produced by preference uncertainty in the common agency set up. Whereas the
interest group contract is always dominant under the three forms of uncertainty we look at,
the specific kind of uncertainty which is considered plays a crucial role as far as the effects
of the linear contract under common agency are concerned. Under imperfect political
transparency equilibrium expected inflation is lower that under perfect transparency, as
opacity plays a ”disciplining” role on pressure groups by inducing them to choose less
aggressive lobbying strategies. Furthermore, there exists a value of opacity for which
inflation expectations are equal to zero, but the commitment solution can be obtained
only on average. As for the second type of preference uncertainty, our main finding is
that economic imperfect transparency has no effect on expected values. Finally, under
”selfishness” uncertainty, we do not confirm CM’s [6] single agency finding that it is always
convenient for a benevolent central banker to pretend to be selfish and subsequently
break the incentive contracts. Contrary to what happens under single agency, when this
happens, the central banker may generate a negative inflation surprise: equilibrium output
may be lower than the natural rate.
1.1 Common agency and uncertain ”political” transparency
The macroeconomic set up of the model is a standard one. The aggregate supply side of
the economy is summarized in a standard AS function incorporating the surprise inflation
effect:
y = yn + α (π − πe) + ε (1)
where y and yn are the actual and the natural levels of output, π is the inflation rate, πe
is the private sector’s rational expectation of the same rate and ε is a zero-mean, serially
uncorrelated real aggregate supply shock. In order to avoid some well known difficulties
which arise when the problem of central bank transparency is introduced into the model,
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and to obtain closed form solutions, throughout the paper we normalize α = 1, in line
with the approach followed by most of the recent literature on central bank transparency
(see, e.g., Geeratz [20]; Hughes-Hallet and Viegi [24]; Kobayashi [26]; Demertzis, Hughes
Hallett and Viegi [13]; Muscatelli [29] and [30]; Demertzis and Hughes Hallett [12]).
As for the aggregate demand side, we employ the formulation adopted by Walsh [35]:
π = m+ v − γε (2)
where m is the rate of growth of the money supply (controlled by the central bank), v is
either a control error or a velocity shock (with E(ν) = 0, E(ν2) = σ2v , and E(v²) = 0),
and the term γε represents the (negative, as γ > 0) impact of the real supply shock on
inflation. Equation (2) allows us to explicitly consider the influence of the contracts on
the bank’s choice of its instrument.
In a standard Barro-Gordon model - without the imperfect transparency problem and
the incentive contract - the central bank loss function would be: LCB =
¡
y − yCB
¢2
+βπ2,
so that society’s aversion to inflation and the central banker’s degree of conservatism
(inflation aversion) would be both equal to β, while the output target of the monetary
authorities would be equal to yCB = yn + z (the term z ≥ 0 represents the expansionary
bias of the monetary authorities). In the present analysis, the private sector, represented
by the government, can influence the central banker’s behavior through a linear incentive
scheme that penalizes deviations of actual inflation from its target. Following Walsh [35],
the incentive scheme is composed of a fixed reward t0 and a marginal penalty t applied
to the realized inflation rate, so that the form of the scheme is:9 t0− tπ. The presence of
a linear incentive scheme modifies the central bank’s loss function LCB along the lines of
Walsh [35].
Following CM [7], a second principal can be included into the analysis; this third
player represents a disaffected interest group endowed with own objectives which are in
conflict with those of the ”general” public (society). As mentioned in the introduction, the
objectives of the interest group can differ from those of society in a number of dimension.
Here we will consider only what appears to be the most realistic (and probably empirically
relevant) case, i.e., that of an interest group having a greater output target than that of
society, set equal to the natural level yn. The output target of the interest group is taken
to be equal to: yg = yn + g, with g > 0. This assumption seems a natural one since, as
discussed in CM [7], a number of relevant aggregate players interested in higher output
can be easily imagined.10 The interest group offers a contract based on the observed
output values: it assigns to the central banker a given payment τ 0 minus a penalty equal
to τ (yg − y). The interest group’s contract is thus: τ 0 − τ (yg − y).
9Walsh [35] showed that an optimal penalty rate exists that produces the same policy outcomes as
those that would arise under credible commitment. This penalty rate rises the marginal costs for the
central banker of higher money growth rates, thus inducing her to eliminate the inflation bias.
10CM [7] point out a problem with this interest group which is present also in our analysis. Since in our
model - as in that of CM [7] - expectations are always satisfied in the final equilibrium, the consequent
output level is always equal to the natural one, and the central banker is always punished. Her effort to
increase output beyond the natural value is hence futile. We will discuss this issue more in detail in the
following sections.
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The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the government
offers a contract that makes the payment to the central banker contingent on inflation
performance, the interest group offers a competing incentive scheme that makes the central
banker’s reward contingent on output performance and the ”nature” chooses the central
bank’s preference parameter, which is unknown to the two principals. Then the private
sector forms rational price expectations (not knowing the value of the central bank’s
preference parameter, which is opaque to the public), the stochastic supply shock takes
place and the central banker sets the policy instrument. Finally, the stochastic control
shock v occurs, inflation and output outcomes are realized and the central banker is
rewarded. It should be noted that, in line with CM [7] but differently from Walsh [35],
monetary policy does not react to the shock v, which was there taken as observed by the
central bank, whereas it is here assumed to be stochastic for all players.
The central bank loss function, LCB, combines the objective function chosen by CM
[7], and the standard function with imperfect transparency, based on the assumption that
monetary policy is delegated to a central banker who is randomly selected from society
(Beetsma and Jensen [2]; [3]):11
LCB =
£
(1 + λ) (y − yn − z)2 + (β − λ)π2
¤
− ξ [τ 0 − τ (yn + g − y) + t0 − tπ] (3)
where ξ is a parameter representing the trade-off between the contract benefits and the
loss for the central banker due to inflation and output deviations from the respective
targets.
Uncertainty on the central banker’s preferences is represented by the random variable
λ ∈ [−1,β], where E (λ) = 0, E (λ) = σ2λ, and E is the expectation operator. In
this section we focus our attention to the so-called ”contingent”, or ”political”, view of
transparency (Eijffinger and Geraats [16]; Posen [32]; Hughes-Hallet and Viegi [24]) -
i.e., that related to information asymmetries between central bank and the general public
about the weight of the arguments in the monetary authorities’ objective functions - which
relates transparency to the CB’s degree of conservativeness.12 According to equation (3),
the level of uncertainty associated with CB’s preferences is represented by the variance
σ2λ. As the random variable λ takes values in a compact set and has expected value equal
to zero, σ2λ must have a well defined upper bound; more precisely:
13: σ2λ ∈ [0,β]. Finally,
note that λ, ε and v are uncorrelated.
In line with the procedure adopted by Chortareas and Miller [7], the central bank
solves the problem:
min
m
ELCB = E
£
(1 + λ) (y − yn − z)2 + (β − λ) π2
¤
−Eξ [τ 0 − τ (yn + g − y) + t0 − tπ]
s.t. π = m+ v − γε; y = yn + (π − πe) + ε
11We choose this specification because it avoids the arbitrary effects of CB’s preference uncertainty on
average monetary policy documented by Beetsma and Jensen [3].
12See, among others, Cukierman [11], Geraats [20], Gersbach and Hahn [21] [22].
13For a simple demonstration of this result, see Ciccarone et. al. [10], Appendix.
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Recalling that the velocity shock ν is stochastic for both the public and the central banker,
and that she can observe the exact value of the supply shock ε, the reaction function is:
m =
µ
γ − 1 + λ
1 + β
¶
ε+
µ
1 + λ
1 + β
¶
πe +
µ
1 + λ
1 + β
¶
z +
ξ (τ − t)
2 (1 + β)
(4)
The public’s inflation expectations are: πe = E [π] = E [m+ v + γε]; using equation
(4) and recalling that ε and λ are uncorrelated, we obtain:
πe =
µ
1
β
¶
z +
µ
ξ
2β
¶
(τ − t) (5)
According to the timing of the game moves, the interest group sets its choice variable
τ knowing the reaction function of the central bank (4) and the value of the private sector
expectations (5); its optimization problem is then:
minE
τ
¡
LIG
¢
= E
£
(y − yg)2 + bπ2
¤
+ ψE [τ 0 − τ (yg − y)]
s.t. equations (1); (2); (4); (5)
Parameter ψ represents the interest group’s relative concern about the contract costs and
the loss due to deviation form its y and π targets, while b is the inflation aversion of the
same interest group. By substituting m and πe into the equations of aggregate demand
and supply (so as to obtain values for y and π), the optimization problem can be rewritten
as:
min
τ
ELIG = E
∙µ
1− (1 + λ)
1 + β
¶
ε+
λ
β
z + v +
λξ
2β (1 + β)
(τ − t)− g
¸2
+
+Eb
∙µ
−1 + λ
1 + β
¶
ε+
µ
1 + λ
β
¶
z + v +
µ
(1 + λ+ β) ξ
2β (1 + β)
¶
(τ − t)
¸2
+
+Eψ [τ 0 − τ (yg − y)]
The optimality condition for the interest group turns out to depend on the variance
σ2λ, i.e. on E
¡
λ2
¢
, and the reaction function is:
τ =
µ
2 (1 + β)
ξ2
¶
(1 + β)
£
β2ψg − zξb
¤
− zξ (1 + b)σ2λ
b (1 + β)2 + (1 + b)σ2λ
+ t (6)
It is straightforward to verify that by setting σλ = 0 the same reaction function as CM
[7] is obtained: τ |σλ=0 = 2ξ
³
β2ψg
ξb − z
´
+ t.
A first observation concerning equation (6) has to do with the reaction of τ (given the
incentive t supplied by the government) to an increase in the degree of opacity σ2λ. It is
easy to check that this reaction is negative: ∂τ∂σ2λ
< 0 An increase in preference uncertainty
makes it less convenient for the interest group to strongly incentivize the central banker
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with a high penalty rate. This is not surprising: coherently with Brainard’s [4] principle,
higher uncertainty (the increase in ”political” opacity) induces moderation in the use of
the instrument.
The behavior of the government is described by the solution of the problem:
minE
t
¡
LG
¢
= E
£
(y − yn − z)2 + βπ2
¤
+ φE [t0 − tπ]
s.t. equations (1); (2); (4); (5)
where φ is the weight attached by the government to the cost of providing the incentive,
relative to the loss deriving from the deviations of y and π from their respective targets.14
By proceeding as in the interest group’s case, we can compute the government’s reaction
function:
t =
µ
2z (1 + β)
ξ
¶∙
β (φ+ ξ) + ξσ2λ
ξσ2λ + (2φ+ ξ)β (1 + β)
¸
+
β (1 + β) (φ+ ξ) + ξσ2λ
ξσ2λ + (2φ+ ξ)β (1 + β)
τ (7)
It is again straightforward to verify that by setting σλ = 0, it reduces to that found
by CM [7]: t|σλ=0 = φ+ξ2φ+ξ
h
2z
ξ + τ
i
. Differently from the interest group’s reaction, the
response of the government to an increase in opacity σλ (for given τ) seems to depend in
complicate ways on parameter values. We shall however show in the next subsection that
if the government’s concern for inflation is greater than that of the interest group, greater
opacity leads to a decrease in the equilibrium penalty rates of both principals.
1.2 Equilibrium outcomes and the dominance of the interest
group’s contract
Using the reaction functions (6) and (7) we calculate the Nash solution for the interest
group’s incentive:
τN =
µ
2β
ξ2βφ
¶"
(1 + β) [βψg + ξzb] [β (1 + β) (2φ+ ξ) + ξσ2λ]
b (1 + β)2 + (1 + b)σ2λ
− [φ+ (2φ+ ξ)β] zξ
#
If σλ = 0, we get again CM’s result: τN =
³
2
ξφ
´h
(2φ+ξ)β2ψg
ξb − φz
i
. Thus, in the case of
full transparency, the condition τN > 0 requires to satisfy the inequality: β2 (2φ+ ξ)ψg−
bξφz > 0. When it is instead σ2λ > 0, in order to have a positive value of τ
N it must be:
[(1 + β)βψg + (b− β) ξz − (1 + 2β) (1 + b)φz] ξσ2λ+(1 + β)
2 £β2 (2φ+ ξ)ψg − bξφz¤ > 0
14Note that, as in Walsh [35], the central bank and the government share the same output and inflation
targets.
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Although the positivity of τN depends in a complicated way on parameter values (relative
to σ2λ), comparability with CM requires to take that the inequality β
2 (2φ+ ξ)ψg−bξφz >
0 holds. The condition hence becomes:
(1 + β)βψg + (b− β) ξz − (1 + 2β) (1 + b)φz
(1 + β)2
£
β2 (2φ+ ξ)ψg − bξφz
¤ ξ > − 1
σ2λ
This inequality implies that, under imperfect political transparency, τN > 0 requires that
ψ and g are large enough in comparison to φ and z: the interest group must have a greater
concern for output (and a greater concern for the incentive cost) than the government.
By using the expression for τN , we can calculate the equilibrium value for the gov-
ernment incentive and summarize the Nash equilibrium between the government and the
interest group as:
τN =
µ
2
ξ2φ
¶ ∙
(1 + β) [βψg + ξzb]
Ω
Λ
− [φ+ (2φ+ ξ)β] zξ
¸
(8)
tN =
µ
2
ξ2φΛ
¶©
β (1 + β) [Ω− φβ (1 + β)]ψg + [(b− β) ξ − β (1 + b)φ] ξσ2λz
ª
(9)
where:
Ω =
£
β (1 + β) (2φ+ ξ) + ξσ2λ
¤
; Λ = b (1 + β)2 + (1 + b)σ2λ
The reactions of Ω and Λ to opacity are: ∂Ω∂σ2λ = ξ > 0;
∂Λ
∂σ2λ
= 1+ b > 0; these allow us
to analyze the effects of opacity on the equilibrium incentive rates:
∂τN
∂σ2λ
=
Ã
2 (1 + β)2 (βψg + ξzb)
ξ2φΛ2
!
[ξ (b− β)− 2β (1 + b)φ]
∂tN
∂σ2λ
=
Ã
2 (1 + β)2 (βψg + bξz)
ξ2φΛ2
!
[ξ (b− β)− β (1 + b)φ]
The reactions of τNand tN to opacity are hence ruled by the relative values of the inflation
aversion parameters of the government (and central bank, on average) and of the interest
group:
∂τN
∂σ2λ
R 0 ⇔ 1
β
+ 1 R
µ
1
b
+ 1
¶µ
2φ
ξ
+ 1
¶
∂tN
∂σ2λ
R 0⇔ 1
β
R 1
b
+
µ
1
b
+ 1
¶
φ
ξ
If the inflation aversion of the government, β, is high enough, the incentives of both
the government and the interest group will tend to decrease when opacity increases.
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In general, it appears reasonable to assume β ≥ b, i.e., the government/society has a
greater (or equal) concern for inflation than the expansionary lobbyist;15 in this case the
impact of σλ is unequivocal: greater opacity leads to a decrease in the penalty rates of
both principals (∂τN/∂σ2λ and ∂t
N/∂σ2λ are both negative). When the two principals
experiment an increase in the common source of uncertainty related to the ”type” of
central banker to whom monetary policy is delegated, Brainard’s moderation principle
leads them to reduce their penalty rates. The government and the interest group act
more carefully when they know less about the way in which the central bank might react
to their incentives.16
Note however that the final equilibrium outcomes for the macroeconomic (observable)
variables do not depend on the values of τN and tN per se, but rather on their difference¡
τN − tN
¢
, as shown by the following equations:
πe =
µ
1
β
¶
z +
µ
ξ
2β
¶¡
τN − tN
¢
π =
µ
−1 + λ
1 + β
¶
ε+
µ
1 + λ
β
¶
z +
µ
(1 + λ+ β) ξ
2β (1 + β)
¶¡
τN − tN
¢
+ v (10)
y = yn +
µ
1− (1 + λ)
1 + β
¶
ε+
λ
β
z +
λξ
2β (1 + β)
¡
τN − tN
¢
+ v
These results are in line with the general findings of multiple agency theory. Since the two
principals have conflicting aims and act non cooperatively, their incentives are substitute,
not complement, that is, they influence outcomes in opposite ways.17
From equations (8) and (9) we obtain the value ∆rates (σ2λ) = τ
N − tN as a function of
opacity (and of the other parameters):
τN − tN = ∆rates
¡
σ2λ
¢
=
µ
2 (1 + β)
ξ2Λ
¶£
(1 + β)
¡
β2ψg − bξz
¢
− (1 + b) ξzσ2λ
¤
(11)
The derivative of this expression with respect to opacity is:
∂∆rates (σ2λ)
∂σ2λ
= −
Ã
2β (1 + β)2 (1 + b) (bξz + βψg)
ξ2Λ2
!
< 0
15It could of course be possible to consider the opposite case of a conservative interest group highly
concerned for inflation (i.e., the financial community). However we reckon this as less interesting case
in a context where most of the central banks of the industrialised countries set values for their inflation
targets around 2%.
16A possible interpretation of the stronger impact of σ2λ on τ
N than on tN is related to the fact that the
CB and the Government share the same concern for inflation (β) whereas that of the IG (b) is lower. It
is well known since Brainard’s seminal article that the (negative) reaction to an increase in σ2λ is stronger
the higher is weight attached to inflation in the player objective function.
17This behavior creates a negative externality, the value of which can be measures by solving for the
cooperative equilibrium and by comparing the values of the resulting outcomes with those obtained in
the Nash equilibrium.
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This derivative shows that ∆rates (σ2λ) is a decreasing function of σ
2
λ: as opacity increases,
τN and tN get closer (further apart) when τN > tN (τN < tN).
By plugging expression (11) into equations (10) we get:
(πe)∗ =
µ
1
β
¶
z +
µ
ξ
2β
¶
∆rates
¡
σ2λ
¢
π∗ =
µ
−1 + λ
1 + β
¶
ε+
µ
1 + λ
β
¶
z + v +
µ
(1 + λ+ β) ξ
2β (1 + β)
¶
∆rates
¡
σ2λ
¢
(12)
y∗ = yn +
µ
1− (1 + λ)
1 + β
¶
ε+
λ
β
z + v +
λξ
2β (1 + β)
∆rates
¡
σ2λ
¢
An increase in transparency (a decrease in opacity σ2λ) has an expansionary effect: it
raises output y∗ as well as inflation (effective and expected). As we now turn to show,
it is reasonable to assume that τN > tN ; this allows to explain the expansionary effect
of higher transparency as produced by an increase in the difference between the penalty
rates set by the interest group and by the government. This result shows that the finding
by Muscatelli [29] and by Beetsma and Jensen [2] that under single agency a stochastic
inflation bias persists in equilibrium holds also under common agency
One crucial issue in our analysis is how the introduction of transparency affects the
relative strength of the competing contracts offered by the two principals. In order to
tackle this issue we check, along the lines of CM, if the interest group contract always
dominates that of the government. To this aim, we set t = 0 in (6) so as to obtain:
τNt=0 =
µ
2 (1 + β)
ξ2Λ
¶£
(1 + β)
£
β2ψg − ξbz
¤
− zξ (1 + b)σ2λ
¤
Thus the value of τNt=0 is identical to that of the difference ∆rates (σ2λ) in equation (11),
that is the difference between the penalty rates under multiple agency. This implies that
the equilibrium values for output and inflation (expected/effective) when the government
is absent, yt=0, πet=0 and πt=0, are identical to those of equations (12):
(πe)∗ − πet=0 = π∗ − πt=0 = y∗ − yt=0 = 0
The presence of uncertain ”political” transparency (as far as inflation and output are
concerned) does not change CM’s result that the interest group contract dominates the
Government’s one: the results obtained when both agents set their rewards are the same
as those cropping up when only the interest group offers the incentive reward. This is
indeed reasonable, as the kind of uncertainty faced by the two players is the same (none of
them possesses an information advantage) and they set τ and t under a Nash interaction.
In this case the interest group also sets a τ which always dominates the government
incentive t in affecting the central bank’s behavior.
Finally, expression (11) allows us to examine the relationship between opacity and the
sign of the difference between the two penalty rates; τN is greater than tN if σ2λ is small
enough:
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τN − tN R 0 iff: σ2λ Q
(1 + β)
¡
β2ψg − bξz
¢
(1 + b) ξz
(13)
This condition is coherent with the idea that imperfect political transparency ”softens”
the problem of the inflationary bias induced by the dominance of the IG contract. As-
suming that the condition guaranteeing in CM[7] that τN > tN holds, i.e., β2ψg > bξz, it
becomes possible, yet not guaranteed, to obtain the same result under imperfect political
transparency. If it is indeed τN > tN (this happens when opacity is relatively low), con-
dition (13) also shows that a rise in σ2λ closes the gap between the two penalty rates and
reduces (πe)∗and π∗ - as it can be straightforwardly checked from the first two equations
(12).
1.3 Average inflation under uncertain ”political” transparency
The result obtained in the previous section mirrors that of CM, but the situations with
and without central bank preference uncertainty are not at all the same. To see the
differences, it is first necessary to recall that the value of inflation expectations when
σ2λ = 0 (that computed in CM) is (π
e)det = βψg/ξb and compare it with the equilibrium
value (πe)∗ under preference uncertainty (from equations (12)). The difference between
the two rates is:
(πe)det − (πe)∗ = (1 + b)σ
2
λ
Λ
µ
β
ξb
ψg + z
¶
> 0
unless, of course, σ2λ = 0.
Under preference uncertainty equilibrium expected inflation is lower than under perfect
transparency: for the reason we highlighted above, when opacity increases above zero
the difference (τ − t) decreases and the inflation bias falls. This result shows the role
that imperfect transparency can play in a multiple agency environment for the conduct
of monetary policy. The dominance of the interest group contract might suggest that
opacity plays no relevant role; yet, under perfect transparency the interest group offers a
reward τ that, when combined with the government’s t, produces expected inflation (and
average inflation) higher than under imperfect transparency. Central bank’s opacity hence
softens the problem raised by the dominance of the interest group contract, as average
inflation tends to get closer to the value desired by society. Actual equilibrium inflation
under opacity, π∗, may instead be greater or smaller than that under full transparency
according to the realized value of the shock λ, which influences π∗ as shown by the second
of equations (12). As πe measures also the average value of inflation, the presence of
imperfect transparency can reduce the average inflation bias.
The introduction of imperfect ”political” transparency brings in another relevant out-
come, as the presence of a new parameter allows us to determine a value of opacity
σ2λ|πe=0 able to bring (πe)∗ to zero. Before proceeding in this direction, it should be noted
that, being σ2λ the variance of a random variable and not an instrumental variable in the
hands of the central bank, the value σ2λ|πe=0, which is a punctual value within the interval
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[0,β], corresponds to a specific and very particular circumstance which, given the other
parameter values, is very unlikely to materialize.
To determine this value, we calculate the commitment solution by setting ξ = λ = 0 in
the central bank’s reaction function (4), so as to obtain: m =
³
γ − 1
1+β
´
ε+
³
1
1+β
´
πe +³
1
1+β
´
z. Setting πe = 0 and β →∞ we then obtain:
m = γε; π = v; y = yn + v + ε
In the multiple agency-imperfect transparency setting, in order to have (πe)∗ = 0 the
first of expressions (12) must be equated to zero. The value of σ2λ which produces this
result is equal to:
σ2λ
¯¯
πe=0 =
β (1 + β)2 ψg
(1 + b) ξz
(14)
When opacity reaches the value σ2λ|πe=0, expected inflation exactly matches the value
under credible commitment: (πe)∗ = πecommit = 0. This is a relevant departure from CM’s
common agency results, as in their model with full transparency it is (πe)det = βψg/ξb > 0,
and it is hence never possible to eliminate a positive inflation bias.
However, as this value of opacity (14) which brings inflation expectations to zero must
be economically meaningful, σ2λ|πe=0 must lie in the admissible interval [0, β] or, better,
it must not exceed the upper admissible bound β. This restriction imposes bounds on
the remaining model parameters. In our setting σ2λ is also subject to another restric-
tion, as it must allow for a meaningful (i.e. positive) equilibrium value of τN . When
opacity equals σ2λ|πe=0, the value of τN given by equation (8) must be greater than zero:
τN (σ2λ|πe=0) > 0 implies an additional restriction on the model parameters. By imposing
the two conditions, we obtain in fact:
σ2λ
¯¯
πe=0 =
β (1 + β)2 ψ
(1 + b) ξ
g
z
< β iff
g
z
<
(1 + b) ξ
(1 + β)2 ψ
τN
¡
σ2λ
¯¯
πe=0
¢
> 0 iff
g
z
>
(1 + b)φ
β (1 + β)ψ
Combining the two inequalities we can specify an interval for the admissible values of the
ratio g/z:
τN > 0 ∧ σ2λ
¯¯
πe=0 < β requires:
(1 + b) ξ
(1 + β)2 ψ
>
g
z
>
(1 + b)φ
β (1 + β)ψ
and:
(1 + b) ξ
(1 + β)2 ψ
>
(1 + b)φ
β (1 + β)ψ
From which we obtain the final set of restrictions:
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τN > 0 ∧ σ2λ
¯¯
πe=0 < β iff:
I)
(1 + b) ξ
(1 + β)2 ψ
>
g
z
>
(1 + b)φ
β (1 + β)ψ
II)
β
1 + β
>
φ
ξ
Condition II), which must necessarily hold for condition I) to be possible, imposes a
strong (and neatly interpretable) restriction on two key parameters: in order to obtain
inflation expectations equal to zero with acceptable values for τ and σ2λ, the ratio
φ
ξ must
be less than 1: the weight attached by the government to the cost of its incentive scheme
must be smaller than the weight attached by the central bank to the two schemes. An
optimal degree of opacity exists only if the central bank cares for the incentive payment
more than the government. The intuition for this result runs as follows: for inflation
expectations to be equal to zero, ∆rates (σ2λ) = τ
N − tN must be big enough (in absolute
value) and negative; this implies that tN must be big enough, which is more likely when
the cost of the incentive contract is small for the government, or when the central bank
attaches to this incentive a high value.
The government plays an essential role in this context, as only its presence allows
for the possibility to obtain the degree of opacity that guarantees πe = 0. To see this
point, note that, by calculating whether τN is positive when the government does not
use the incentive contract (i.e. in the case of t = 0), it follows that in order to obtain
τNt=0 =
³
2(1+β)
ξ2Λ
´ £
(1 + β)
¡
β2ψg − ξbz
¢
− zξ (1 + b)σ2λ
¤
> 0, it must be −βψg > ξbz,
which can never be true. Thus, when it is σ2λ = σ
2
λ|πe=0 it is certainly τNt=0 < 0. This shows
that it is impossible to conceive a game in which the interest group contract dominates
and where there exists a value of opacity able to bring inflation expectations to zero,
unless the governments also acts in the economy by providing an incentive scheme to the
central bank.
It is difficult to analyze the dependence of σ2λ|πe=0 on the model’s fundamentals (basi-
cally, the preference parameters) as conditions I) and II) involve several model parameters.
A simple numerical example can however show some of the effects of the variations in the
central bank’s average degree of conservatism (β) on σ2λ|πe=0. From inequality I) we note
that the existence of an economically feasible value of σ2λ|πe=0 is more unlikely when the
central bank is on average conservative; this remark is confirmed by two numerical ex-
amples shown in figure 1 below, where the expected inflation rate (πe)∗ is plotted against
opacity under two different parameterisations:
With parameterisation A), where the central bank is (perceived as) ”populist” (β =
0.12), the opacity value ensuring an average inflation rate equal to zero lies inside the
interval defined by conditions I) and II) and is equal to σ2λ|πe=0 = 0.1146; this result
requires that the central bank cares about the incentives twice as much as the interest
group: the ratio ξψ is equal to 2. In parametrisation B) the central bank is conservative on
average (β = 2) but the ratio bβ = 0.75 is the same as in parameterisation A) (on average,
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Figure 1: Expected inflation (πe)∗ as a function of opacity σ2λ, for two different parame-
terisations: A) β = 0.12, b = 0.095, ψ = 1, ξ = 2, g = 1, z = 0.6 ; and B) β = 2, b = 1.5,
ψ = 1, ξ = 6, g = 1, z = 0.6. Note that for both parameterizations the central bank and
the government have an expansionary bias that is 40% lower than that of the interest
group.
the interest group still cares about inflation less than the central bank). ”Optimal” opacity
σ2λ|πe=0 is now equal to the maximum possible value (i.e., β = 2), but in this extreme case
the required ξψ is equal to 6 (three times larger than in the previous parameterisation).
If ξψ where lower, σ
2
λ|πe=0 would lie outside the admissible interval defined by I)-II). A
relatively high degree of conservatism may hence rule out the possibility of using opacity
as a ”discipline device” to counteract the expansionary pull of the interest group incentive
scheme, as it may require an unrealistic value of ξψ .
The numerical example of Figure 1 may help to explain some of the features of the
observed behavior of central banks operating in different institutional set-ups with respect
to political transparency. A result of the empirical research on transparency is that
the European Central Bank (together with many other ones) has a index of political
transparency significantly greater than that of, for example, the Central Bank of Japan18.
Since the role and the presence of interest groups in Euro area and in Japan can be
considered as equivalent (actually, it is probably stronger in the Euro area than in the
other country) and the ECB is perceived, on average, as more conservative than the Bank
of Japan, the above analysis suggests that, in order to achieve a low inflation rate, the
ECB may be less opaque than the other central bank.
Finally, it should be stressed that the story we have told on σ2λ|πe=0 holds only for the
average values of the endogenous macroeconomic variables. Writing π∗ as a function of
(πe)∗:
18See Eijffinger and Geraats [16]; for a principal components analysis on the Eijffinger and Geraats
database (confirming the above mentioned results) see also Di Bartolomeo and Marchetti [14].
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π∗ =
µ
−1 + λ
1 + β
¶
ε+
µ
λ
1 + β
¶
z + v +
(1 + λ+ β)
(1 + β)
(πe)∗
it is clear that when σλ = σ2λ|πe=0 the equilibrium values of (actual) inflation and output
reduce to:
π∗ =
µ
−1 + λ
1 + β
¶
ε+
µ
λ
1 + β
¶
z + v
y∗ = yn +
µ
β − λ
1 + β
¶
ε+
µ
λ
1 + β
¶
z + v
If z > 0, it can never be π∗ = v, unless β →∞, or ε = λ = 0. The commitment solution
can be obtained only on average, while in any period actual inflation is generally different
from the commitment value.
2 Common agency and uncertain ”economic” trans-
parency
Following Muscatelli [30], case c), we now assume that the central bank’s inflation aversion
β is perfectly known, whereas there exists uncertainty on its output target, i.e., what is
known in the literature as ”economic” transparency (see, e.g. Eijffinger and Geraats [16]).
In this case the central bank output target is equal to: yCB = yn + z + θ, where θ is a
random variable, with E (θ) = 0 and variance σ2θ. The timing of the game is the same as
in the previous model, and we continue to assume that α = 1.
Since θ has zero mean and finite variance (and is uncorrelated with ε and v), it appears
coherent to assume that it takes values on a finite set: θ ∈ [θlow, θhigh], with θlow < 0 and
θhigh > 0. A reasonable value for θlow is −z: when this level of θ is realized, the central
bank output target exactly matches the natural rate yn. As for the determination of θhigh,
we can assume that in our model the interest group represents that fraction of society
with the highest desired level of output (the maximum expansionary bias). θhigh can
hence be set equal to (g − z): when this value is realized, the central bank’s output target
yn+z+θhigh will be given by the maximum expansionary bias: yn+g. If θ ∈ [−z, (g − z)],
the maximum value of the variance is19 σ2θ =
1
4
g2, so that σ2θ ∈ [0, g2/4].
The objective function of the central bank is:
LCB =
£
(y − (yn + z + θ))2 + βπ2
¤
− ξ [τ 0 − τ (yn + g − y) + t0 − tπ]
The rate of money growth is obtained by solving the following problem:
min
m
ELCB = E
£
(y − yn − z − θ)2 + βπ2
¤
−Eξ [τ 0 − τ (yn + g − y) + t0 − tπ]
s.t. (1); (2)
19This value is obtained by following the procedure suggested in Ciccarone et. al. [10].
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From the first order condition we obtain the central bank reaction function:
m =
θ
1 + β
+
1
1 + β
(πe + z)−
µ
1
1 + β
− γ
¶
ε+
ξ
2 (1 + β)
(τ − t) (15)
Price expectations by private agents depends on E (m): πe = E (π) = E (m+ v + γε).
By using equation (15) together with E (θ) = 0 they turn out to be equal to:
πe =
µ
1
β
¶
z +
µ
ξ
2β
¶
E (τ − t)
This expression for price expectation is the same as that we found under uncertain ”polit-
ical” transparency (see 10). We can then express the rate of money growth, the inflation
rate and the output as a function of (τ − t):
m =
θ
1 + β
−
µ
1
1 + β
− γ
¶
ε+
µ
1
β
¶
z +
ξ
2β
E (τ − t)
π =
θ
1 + β
−
µ
1
1 + β
¶
ε+
µ
1
β
¶
z +
ξ
2β
E (τ − t) + v (16)
y = yn +
θ
1 + β
+
µ
β
1 + β
¶
ε+ v (17)
We now calculate the interest group reaction function by solving the problem:
minE
τ
¡
LIG
¢
= E
£
(y − yg)2 + bπ2
¤
+ ψE [τ 0 − τ (yg − y)]
s.t. (16); (17)
By proceeding as in the previous section, we obtain the interest group reaction function:
τ =
µ
2
ξ
¶
β2ψg − bξz
bξ
+ t
which is exactly the same as that obtained by CM [7] without preference uncertainty.
The government’s problem is:
minE
τ
¡
LG
¢
= E
£
(y − (yn + z))2 + βπ2
¤
+ φE [t0 − tπ]
s.t. (16); (17)
and its reaction function is:
t =
2 (ξ + φ)
ξ (ξ + 2φ)
z +
µ
ξ + φ
ξ + 2φ
¶
τ
which is also identical to the expression obtained by CM [7].
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It follows that under imperfect economic transparency the difference between the
(Nash) equilibrium values of the penalty rates, (τ ec − tec), and the values for the en-
dogenous variables are:
τ ec − tec = 2
ξ
µ
β2ψg
ξb
− z
¶
πe(ec) =
βψ
ξb
g
πec =
θ
1 + β
+
βψ
ξb
g + v −
µ
1
1 + β
¶
ε
yec = yn +
θ
1 + β
+
µ
β
1 + β
¶
ε+ v
Whereas the expected values are the same as those of CM, the actual values of inflation
and output, πec and yec, differ only for the presence in our model of the additive term
θ/ (1 + β). In the presence of uncertainty on the output target, the solution differs from
the full transparency case only for the presence of a term depending on θ and having
expected value equal to zero: the two solutions are the same on average. Opacity on yn
hence matters only for the issue of stabilization of output and of inflation around their
average values, but has no effect on the inflationary bias problem. This was not the case
under opacity on β, as in that context the value of πe was dependent on the variance of
λ. This result is in line with Muscatelli’s [30] finding that the introduction of the random
variable θ in the single agency context does not alter the results with respect to the case
of full ”economic” transparency.
The reason for this result lies in the nature of the uncertainty represented by θ. Its
consideration amounts only to the introduction of an additional source of additive un-
certainty into the model, and its role is hence equivalent to that of the other exogenous
shock, ε and v: since the players’ optimization problems are linear-quadratic, the certainty
equivalent principle applies. The introduction of a shock on β (λ in the previous model)
alters instead the other players’ expected evaluation of the central bank’s marginal rate of
substitution between π and y, leading to a situation of multiplicative uncertainty where
Brainard’s principle applies.
3 Common agency and ”selfishness” uncertainty
In this section we extend to the multiple agency context CM’s [6] analysis of uncertainty
on the value of the weight attached by the central bank to the incentive scheme, under
the assumption made throughout this paper that α = 1. To this aim we retain also their
assumption that there exist two types of central bankers: the “benevolent” one cares only
about social welfare (ξ = 0), whereas the “selfish” one responds to the incentive scheme
(ξ > 0).
Denoting with ρ the fraction of society that believes that ξ > 0, with (1− ρ) the
fraction believing that ξ = 0 and with meS,ξ>0 and m
e
S,ξ=0 the expected rates of money
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growth when ξ > 0 and when ξ = 0, CM’s [6] main results under single agency are as
follows. Since the benevolent central banker (ξ = 0) brings about the discretion inflation
rate (meS,ξ=0 = π = z/β), whereas the selfish one (ξ > 0) brings about the optimal
contract inflation rate, which is equal to the commitment solution (meS,ξ>0 = π = 0),
when the value of ξ is uncertain, the expected rate of money growth (where the subscript
S indicates single agency) can be calculated as: E (mS) = ρ
¡
meS,ξ>0
¢
+ (1− ρ)
¡
meS,ξ=0
¢
,
so that πeS = (1− ρ) (z/β). Denoting with mSB and πSB, respectively, the actual money
growth and inflation under single agency when the benevolent central banker accepts the
contract and then breaches it, CM [6] demonstrate that: mSB =
³
γ − 1
1+β
´
ε+
³
1−ρ+β
1+β
´
z
β
and πSB =
³
1−ρ+β
1+β
´
z
β −
³
1
1+β
´
ε + v. Since it is: πSB − πeS > 0, the inflation surprise
makes actual output greater than yn plus the ε shock.
In a context of common agency, we consider the same type of uncertainty on ξ and
treat it as a random variable ξ ∈ {0, ξ1}, where ξ1 > 0,with prob (0) = (1− ρ) and
prob (ξ1) = ρ. It follows that: E (ξ) = ρξ1 and σ2ξ = ρξ
2
1. The central banker knows the
realization of the random variable, whereas the principals know only its distribution. The
general reaction function of the central banker is:
m =
µ
γ − 1
1 + β
¶
ε+
µ
1
1 + β
¶
πe +
µ
1
1 + β
¶
z +
ξ (τ − t)
2 (1 + β)
If she is actually benevolent (ξ = 0) and breaches the contract, the actual money
growth will be given by m =
³
γ − 1
1+β
´
ε +
³
1
1+β
´
πe +
³
1
1+β
´
z, but the principals do
not know this because they cannot observe the realized value of ξ. They must form
expectations, which are given by:
πe = Eπ = E (m+ v + γε)
E (π) = E (m) = E
∙µ
γ − 1
1 + β
¶
ε+
µ
1
1 + β
¶
πe +
µ
1
1 + β
¶
z +
ξ (τ − t)
2 (1 + β)
¸
Recalling that E (ξ) = ρξ1, it is hence:
πe =
µ
1
β
¶
z + ρ
ξ1
2β
(τ − t) = Em (18)
Substituting equation 18 together with the general reaction function of the central
banker into π = m+ v− γε we obtain the expressions for the macroeconomic endogenous
variables, which contain both ξ and ξ1:
π = −
µ
1
1 + β
¶
ε+
z
β
+
ρξ1 + βξ
2β (1 + β)
(τ − t) + v (19)
π − πe = −
µ
1
1 + β
¶
ε+
∙
ξ − ρξ1
2 (1 + β)
¸
(τ − t) + v (20)
y = yn +
µ
β
1 + β
¶
ε+
∙
ξ − ρξ1
2 (1 + β)
¸
(τ − t) + v (21)
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Now we solve the control problems of the principals, start with the interest group:
min
τ
E
£
(y − yg)2 + bπ2
¤
+ ψE [τ 0 − τ (yg − y)]
s.t. (19); (21)
From the first order condition we obtain the following equation:
τ =
Ã
2 (1 + β)2
β2
!
β2ψg − zbρξ1
Γσ2ξ
+ t (22)
were: Γ = (1 + b)β2+ρb (1 + β)2. An increase in ξ1 raises σ2ξ and this, once again and for
given value of t, decreases τ : greater uncertainty makes the interest group more cautious
in its instrument setting.
The Government problem is:
minE
τ
¡
LG
¢
= E
£
(y − (yn + z))2 + βπ2
¤
+ φE [t0 − tπ]
s.t. (19); (21)
which implies:
t =
2 (1 + β) z
βξ1 + (1 + β) (ρξ1 + 2φ)
+
∙
βξ1 + (1 + β) (ρξ1 + φ)
βξ1 + (1 + β) (ρξ1 + 2φ)
¸
τ (23)
By solving the system (22)-(23), the Nash equilibrium values of τ and t could be computed.
The macroeconomic outcomes (19)-(21) depend however only on the difference τ−t, which
(in equilibrium) is given by:
τ − t =
Ã
2 (1 + β)2
β2
!
β2ψg − zbρξ1
Γσ2ξ
By applying the argument of section 1.1 we find that the interest group contract
dominates the government’s one also under ”selfishness” uncertainty.20 It should however
be noted that in this environment in order to have τ − t > 0 it must be β2ψg > zbρξ1.
This condition is similar to the condition β2ψg > zbξ under which τ − t > 0 in CM [7]
were, however, ξ is the perfectly known value denoting the degree of selfishness of the
central banker. In the case of uncertainty we are here considering, ρξ1 does not of course
correspond to that ξ.
The resulting level of equilibrium inflation surprise (20) depends upon the realization
of the variable ξ, so that there are two possible levels of (π − πe): one arises when the
central bank is actually benevolent (ξ = 0, the case discussed in CM [6]) and the other
one when the central bank is selfish (ξ = ξ1 > 0).
20The equilibrium value of τ − t is equal to the equilibrium value of τ computed in the absence of the
government, i.e., when t = 0.
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When ξ = 0 the equilibrium inflation surprise is:
π − πe = −
µ
1
1 + β
¶
ε− ρξ1
"µ
1 + β
β2
¶
β2ψg − zbρξ1
Γσ2ξ
#
+ v
Recalling that E (ξ) = ρξ1 and disregarding the random shocks ε and v, π − πe may
be negative. This occurs when β2ψg > zbρξ1, i.e., when τ − t > 0. Contrary to CM’s
[6] finding (proposition 1), in a common agency set up under ”selfishness” uncertainty,
as long as a fraction of population believes that the central banker is selfish (ρ > 0),
a benevolent central banker who masquerades as selfish may hence generate a negative
inflation surprise (inflation expectations are higher than actual inflation) and an output
lower than the natural rate yn.
This result is due to the interplay of two distinct effects. First, under common agency
the incentive provided by the interest group prevails, inducing a selfish central banker to
expand inflation. Second, the public sector, when forming its expectations, must take into
account the possibility that the central banker is selfish, in which case she would accept
the contract τ and increase inflation. The combination of the two effects leads to a high
level of πe.
Finally, in order to determine whether it is convenient for a benevolent central banker
to masquerade as selfish and then breach the contracts, we must calculate the value of her
loss in this case and compare it with the loss she obtains when she does not masqueraded
as selfish, refuses to subscribe the incentive contract and a truly selfish central banker
determines the rate of money growth. Recalling that y = yn+
h
ξ−ρξ1
2(1+β)
i
(τ − t)+v+
³
β
1+β
´
ε,
when ξ = 0 the expected loss will be equal to:
E
¡
LbCBξ=0
¢
=
(ρξ1)
2
4 (1 + β)
(τ − t)2+
µ
1 + β
β
¶
z2+
∙
(1− β) zρξ1
β (1 + β)
¸
(τ − t) + 2σ2v +
¡
1 + β2
¢
(1 + β)2
σ2ε
When ξ = ξ1 the loss will instead be equal to:
E
³
LbCBξ=ξ1
´
=
(ρ+ β)2 ξ21
4β2 (1 + β)
(τ − t)2 +
µ
1 + β
β
¶
z2 +
∙
zρξ1
β
¸
(τ − t) + 2σ2v +
¡
1 + β2
¢
(1 + β)2
σ2ε
It follows that:
E
³
LbCBξ=ξ1 − L
bCB
ξ=0
´
=
£
(ρ+ 2β) ρ+ β2 (1− ρ)
¤
ξ21
4 (1 + β)β2
(τ − t)2 + (2zρξ1) (τ − t)
If β2ψg > zbρξ1, then it is certainly τ − t > 0, π− πe < 0 and E
³
LbCBξ=ξ1 − L
bCB
ξ=0
´
> 0.
This is however only a sufficient condition: the latter inequality may hold, for some
parameter values, also when τ − t < 0 and π − πe > 0. This qualifies CM’s [6] findings:
under single agency it is always convenient for a benevolent central banker to pretend to
be selfish and subsequently breach the incentive contracts, and the inflation surprise is
always positive, whereas under common agency it is not always convenient for the central
banker to first accept and then breach the contract, and when she does so the inflation
surprise may be either positive or negative.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the effects of linear contracts under common agency and
three types of central bank preference uncertainty. We have highlighted that in this envi-
ronments multiplicative uncertainty produces new results, whereas additive uncertainty
brings about the same equilibrium outcomes already found in the literature.
Under imperfect ”economic” transparency a random variable is simply added to the
central bank’s output target and the certainty equivalent principle continues to apply.
Under multiplicative uncertainty, the degree of opacity influences players’ behavior and
induces them to be more cautious in their instrument setting (Brainard’s principle ap-
plies). The interest group always offers a more ”convincing” linear contract because its
objectives are further away than the government’s objectives from those of the central
bank. When opacity increases, the incentives provided by both principals decrease and
the average inflation bias falls, being always lower than under perfect transparency. Fi-
nally, there exists a value of opacity for which inflation expectations are equal to zero,
but the commitment solution can be obtained only on average.
Multiplicative uncertainty under common agency plays a relevant role also when the
central banker’s degree of ”selfishness” is not perfectly known. In this case, it is not always
convenient for a benevolent central banker to pretend to be selfish, accept the contract
and then breach it. Contrary to the conclusion reached under single agency, when she
masquerades as selfish the inflation surprise may be negative and output may be lower
than the natural rate. This result is due to the interplay of two effects: (i) the incentive
provided by the interest group may prevail, inducing the selfish central banker to expand
inflation; (ii) the public forms inflation expectations taking into account the possibility
that the central banker is selfish, in which case she would accept the contract offered by
the interest group, expanding inflation. The combination of the two effects leads to a high
level of expected inflation.
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